Baroness Chakrabarti: My Lords, I have the duty of opening this debate on amendments tabled by noble Lords in response to Sarah Everard’s abduction, rape and murder by a man who was, at the relevant time, a serving police officer, and further to the public outpouring of revulsion and distrust arising from revelations about how the perpetrator was allowed to thrive in the police service, despite repeated concerns about his character and conduct over so many years. These emerged in particular during sentencing proceedings just over a month ago.
My Amendment 122 attempts to address the fact that as a matter of hard law—as opposed to soft guidance, practice, or anything of that kind—a lone arresting officer is currently permitted to require a person subject to arrest to enter a vehicle or premises other than a police station. This gives rise to obvious dangers of abuse of power and dangers to the majority of officers who, unlike the man in question, undertake hazardous and vital public protection duties in good faith.
I am grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones  of Moulsecoomb. I think the subsequently tabled Amendment 123, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, attempts to tackle a very similar mischief. He will forgive me, I hope, if in a moment I explain why I prefer my original proposal.
My Amendment 275 requires that the inquiry into matters arising from the Sarah Everard atrocity—for that is what it is—be put on a statutory footing under the Inquiries Act 2005. I am grateful not only for the  signature of my noble friend Lord Rosser but for that of the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, and my friend the noble and learned Lord, Lord of Eaton-under-Heywood. I am also grateful for the support that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and a number of other noble Lords from across your Lordships’ House have expressed for this endeavour.
Once more, I hope that my noble friend Lord Rosser —and my noble friend Lord Coaker on his behalf—will forgive me for preferring my precise formulation to his Amendment 281, not least because in this matter the ideal outcome must be for the Home Secretary to hear the legal and public confidence arguments and by her own volition launch a full statutory inquiry under the 2005 Act, long before the Bill before your Lordships’ Committee becomes law.
Finally, I will support my noble friend Lord Rosser’s Amendments 282 and 283, which seem so important given the obvious needs for better training and vetting in the police service.
Amendment 122 amends Section 24 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 governing the powers of police constables who arrest without warrant. It would prevent a police officer in or out of uniform from requiring an arrested person to
“enter a vehicle or premises other than a police station”
unless or until a second officer is in attendance. They would still be able to restrain the arrested person to prevent an escape if so required and, if necessary, to seek bystander assistance in so doing. However, there would be no question of a sole plain-clothed or uniformed officer driving off with an arrested person. This clear and simple change to our law must be better for the safety of all citizens and constables alike.
We now know that the first phase of the hideous abuse of power against Sarah Everard perpetrated by a predatory, murdering rapist was that he went hunting for a young woman under the cloak of dusk and draconian lockdown laws. He persuaded Sarah that he was arresting her under suspicion of breaching those same lockdown laws—something, by the way, that should require those laws being perhaps amended or repealed. While some senior voices in policing had the gall to suggest that she and other women are somehow too naive or compliant, and others have tried to suggest that we ought to perhaps flag down traffic, demand to speak to the control room on an officer’s radio or resort to private sector safety apps on our own mobile phones, it seems that no amount of new guidance to either citizens or constables can substitute for a clear and well-publicised change to primary legislation that everyone can understand.
They will forgive me, I hope, in the spirit of anxious scrutiny and rigorous legislative debate, but Amendment 123, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, and, once more, the indefatigable noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, fails, in my view—or stumbles, at least—at the clear, simple and understood-by-everyone tests. Unlike Amendment 122, Amendment 123 attempts to protect only self-identifying women and apparent child arrestees from single male constables. This, it seems to me, creates various practical  problems, not least in the context of so many young people aged between around 15 and 20, who may or may not present as just below or above 18. Let us bear in mind that this is about on-the-street powers, not the more careful evaluations of age and so on that are possible and vital in the police station and further on into the criminal justice process.
Furthermore, young black and gay men, protesters, the elderly, non-English speakers and people with any number of disabilities have their own reasons, perhaps, to fear getting into a car without a second person being present. A single male officer could also, it seems to me, have reasonable concerns about being required to transport a potentially dangerous male arrestee while driving and without support. So, I believe that Amendment 123 potentially risks breaching Articles 5 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights when read with the non-discrimination provision of Article 14, and for no obvious practical policy justification. Indeed, the requirement that the second officer must be a woman may at times be impractical and of no particular benefit. The protection from abuse in my simpler proposal comes with the presence of a second officer, not their sex.
A further problem, perhaps, with the overengineering of Amendment 123 is that it is capable of rendering an otherwise perfectly lawful arrest unlawful if there are subsequent arguments over conditions (1)(a), (b) or (c) relating to new proposed on-street rights of the suspect to make phone calls and potentially wait for a friend to arrive for up to 30 minutes or such other reasonable time. This kind of thing seems to me much more appropriate for the police station and would no doubt lead to a great deal of litigation as to whether arrests had been rendered unlawful, and consequent damages for unlawful arrest. I prefer the simpler Amendment 122 as more appropriate for primary legislation. Under my proposal, an arrest can be and remain completely lawful, but no one is to be placed in a vehicle or non-police station premises until a second officer arrives. This will protect citizens and lone officers, regardless of sex, gender or age.
Amendment 275 would require the Secretary of State, within one month of the coming into force  of any parts of the legislation currently under scrutiny, to instigate a statutory inquiry under the 2005 Act into the matters arising from the abduction, rape and murder of Sarah Everard. It would identify the lessons to be learned for the professional culture, funding, vetting and organisation of policing, the prevention of violence against women and girls and the investigation and prosecution of misogynistic crimes. This inquiry would be chaired by a senior woman judge or senior woman retired judge and a supporting panel of people of appropriate experience.
Not one but two purely administrative reviews or inquiries have been announced by, first, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner and then the Home Secretary. Forgive me, but no process commissioned by the commissioner from inside the Metropolitan Police can hope to stand equivalent to the statutory independent Stephen Lawrence inquiry, chaired by the late Sir William Macpherson in the late 1990s. The task of once more rebuilding trust in our police service, this  time for women in particular, deserves no less. Sarah Everard’s murder came after years of the most shameful attrition rates in the investigation and prosecution of crimes against women. Nothing short of a Lawrence moment will do.
Further, it seems to me that we must learn from the difficult experience that the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, had in chairing the Home Office review of the Daniel Morgan case and the excoriating statement she published in June. She spoke in terms of being hampered by her non-statutory status and inability to compel the Metropolitan Police in particular to provide witnesses, documents and co-operation. So, a fully statutory judge-led inquiry is vital not just to the public’s and in particular women’s confidence that these matters are being treated with the seriousness they deserve, but to ensure that the inquiry has the powers to compel co-operation that are sadly but clearly required.
As my noble friend Lord Rosser has signed Amendment 275, in my name and those of the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, I do not propose to enter into too much detail about why I prefer my amendment to his Amendment 281. On the one hand, his is a little too prescriptive about the terms of reference for an inquiry that should be led by a judge, in close consultation with both the grieving family and so many stakeholders; on the other, it is perhaps not quite sensitive enough to replicate Lawrence in being judge-led or making specific reference to the death of Sarah Everard as its catalyst. I hope that my noble friends will agree that we all want the Government to respond to good sense, practical law and public opinion, which sometimes all march in step, in giving the inquiry already announced by the Home Secretary full statutory force under the 2005 Act.
Finally, I commend my noble friend Lord Rosser, in his absence, on his Amendments 282 and 283, which go to what seems to me to be the obvious need for far better training and vetting for our police service, in the light of a number of recent scandals, from a woman’s point of view.
The rule of law is a fragile thing, even in a supposedly mature democracy such as ours. The police represent the thin blue line that, alongside our courts, exists to maintain that essential value. While I have spent a lifetime arguing against knee-jerk legislative responses, even to terrible crimes, when those same crimes expose genuine chasms in law and practice and the most heinous institutional dereliction of public duty, we as legislators would also be derelict not to respond. I beg to move.